POP Chain to File Read through __toString / __get

Magic methods create deferred execution edges. Any string context or missing-property access can trigger attacker-controlled code paths inside the object graph. The bug is usually about getting the right method order, not finding a single obviously dangerous class.

Why It Works

• __toString, __get, __wakeup, __destruct run automatically; chaining them reaches a useful sink.

Vulnerable Pattern

• Deserialization in apps defining convenience magic methods that access nested objects.

Exploit Flow

1. Map the object graph carefully.
2. Find the first stringification or property-access sink after deserialization.
3. Wire objects so one magic method triggers the next until the useful file-read or include method runs.

Variations

• File-read gadgets, include gadgets, or gadgets feeding a second-stage deserialization / autoloader path.

Common Blockers

• Missing class definitions in the deserializing context, property-visibility serialization issues, or the final gadget expecting subtle state constraints.

PoC Sketch

// Flan->name -> Clash
// Clash->flan1 -> Baker
// Baker references the getter object that reads a chosen path

Good Situations To Use It

• You control a serialized blob the app deserializes.
• The codebase defines chainable magic methods.
• A reachable gadget reads files or includes paths.

Sources

• midnight_flag2026/web/clash_of_flans